The 2026 Drought in Europe. We’ve known about the risk for years, but we’re still not prepared

Europe was not caught off guard by the drought. The scale of the risk has been known for years; we have forecasts and increasingly accurate data. And yet, yet another summer shows that knowing about the threat is not the same as being prepared for its consequences. The latest data from the JRC and Copernicus are particularly telling. The drought now covers half the land area of the European Union and the United Kingdom. Record-low water levels are being recorded on the Rhine, Danube, Po, and Loire rivers, and flows in many European river basins have dropped to extreme levels. At the same time, this year’s wildfires have already consumed nearly 580,000 hectares—an area more than twice the size of Luxembourg.

These are not three separate stories about drought, heat, and fire. They are different facets of the same crisis of resilience. Water scarcity is no longer a problem that can be confined to hydrological statistics. It is having an increasingly clear impact on agriculture, energy, transportation, the economy, and our security.

What is most concerning, then, is not that Europe is experiencing extreme conditions. What is concerning is that it is experiencing them yet again, and is still not sufficiently prepared for them. Unfortunately, the situation in Poland fits into this European scenario.

The drought now affects half of the EU and the United Kingdom

The latest Combined Drought Indicator (CDI), published by the European Drought Observatory, shows that at the end of July 2026, 50 percent of the territory of the European Union and the United Kingdom was in one of three categories indicating the development of drought: watch, warning, or alert. The “alert” category—in which precipitation deficits and soil moisture shortages result in significant stress on vegetation—covered 9 percent of the territory.

The scale of the phenomenon has not yet exceeded that of the most severe drought of the past decade. During the same period in 2018, drought indices covered 54 percent of the EU and the United Kingdom, and in 2022, 60 percent. However, in 2022, the worst point occurred in mid-August. At that time, as much as 18 percent of the analyzed area was classified as being under alert. And this year’s season is still ongoing, so the worst may still be ahead of us.

What is particularly important, however, is that the precipitation deficit did not stop at causing soil drought. Its effects are already clearly visible in the rivers. The JRC reports very low and extremely low river flows in Central and Eastern Europe, the Alpine region, northern Italy, Norway, and Finland, as well as in major river basins in France and Germany. Record-low water levels are being recorded on the Rhine, Danube, Po, and Loire, among others.

This is the point at which drought ceases to be merely a natural phenomenon and becomes an economic problem.

The economy is quickly feeling the effects of the water shortage

There is not yet a single Europe-wide assessment of the losses caused by the summer drought of 2026, and the estimates—already running into the billions—must be treated with caution. They differ in scope and methodology and are therefore not comparable. The European Commission provides a good point of reference, estimating that droughts cost the EU economy between 2 and 9 billion euros annually.

This summer, above all, illustrates the many components that make up this cost.

In July, the JRC lowered its earlier yield forecasts for winter crops by 1–4 percent, and for grain corn and sunflowers by 6–7 percent. Low water levels are hampering navigation on the Rhine and the Danube, affecting water availability for agriculture and industry, and limiting energy production capacity.

However, the average figures for the entire EU do not reflect the scale of the problems in the hardest-hit regions. In France, Agreste estimates this year’s corn harvest at just 9 million metric tons—35 percent less than in 2025 and the lowest since 1980. The effects of the drought are even more evident on permanent grassland. By the end of July, cumulative biomass growth there was 30 percent lower than the average for the same period from 1989 to 2018. For farms engaged in livestock raising and breeding, this poses a problem that will not end with this summer—the reduced feed supplies will also be felt in the coming months.

On top of that, there is the issue of wildfires. According to EFFIS data covering the period from the beginning of the year through August 16, more than 580,000 hectares have burned in the European Union. This is less than in the record-breaking year of 2025, but still significantly more than the long-term average.

Drought alone does not cause a fire. However, it determines the conditions under which a fire spreads. Dry vegetation becomes flammable, and high temperatures and wind can cause a small fire to quickly spiral out of control. That is why this year’s fire season cannot be analyzed in isolation from the ongoing water shortage.

When a River Limits Energy Production

One of the most telling examples of the effects of this year’s situation is the nuclear power industry. It demonstrates very clearly that access to an adequate supply of water at the right temperature remains a prerequisite for the operation of some European power plants.

On July 9, EDF shut down Unit 2 of the Golfech nuclear power plant in France. There was no accident, and there was no fuel shortage. The problem was the temperature of the Garonne River. Operating regulations require a reduction in power or a temporary shutdown of operations if the river’s temperature exceeds specified limits. In the case of Golfech, the goal was to protect the river from additional thermal load resulting from the discharge of water used for cooling. The unit did not return to the grid until July 26.

But high water temperature is only part of the problem. The volume of water is equally important.

In July, low water levels in the Meuse River affected operations at the Chooz power plant. EDF had to adjust its output to the river conditions and to the Franco-Belgian agreement on required flow rates. One of the units was shut down as a precautionary measure.

The relationship between the hydrological situation and energy production on the Danube is even more evident. In late July, the Paks nuclear power plant in Hungary reduced its output several times due to very low water levels and high water temperatures. The operator explicitly pointed to the effects of the prolonged drought and heat wave.

A similar situation occurred in Romania. On July 28, Nuclearelectrica shut down Unit 1 of the Cernavodă power plant in a controlled manner. An official statement cited exceptionally low water levels in the Danube caused by drought. Should the hydrological situation continue to deteriorate, procedures provided for the possibility of restricting operations at Unit 2 as well.

Golfech, Chooz, Paks, and Cernavodă illustrate different aspects of the same problem. Sometimes the limiting factor is water temperature, sometimes flow, and sometimes both factors simultaneously.

This conclusion is significant not only for the energy sector. We can increase installed capacity, build new power sources, and expand the grid, but part of the infrastructure remains dependent on river conditions. And those conditions change precisely when energy demand rises during heat waves.

Poland – Water Shortage Becoming Increasingly Apparent

The situation in Poland is similar. This is independently confirmed by data from IMGW-PIB, PIG-PIB, and IUNG-PIB. Each of these institutions monitors a different aspect of the water cycle, but all point to a worsening deficit.

On August 17, the IMGW-PIB recorded flows below the SNQ—that is, the long-term average low flow—at more than 400 hydrological stations. Hydrological drought warnings are in effect in many watersheds. This does not mean that the situation is equally severe on all rivers, but the geographic extent of the low flows is already very large.

The data on groundwater are equally concerning. According to a PIG-PIB report published on August 17, the water table of the first aquifer dropped at approximately 80 percent of the monitored observation points in July. At about one-quarter of the observation points, a threat to variable water reserves was also observed, particularly in the eastern and northwestern parts of the country.

However, this does not mean there is a widespread threat to the population’s water supply. PIG-PIB notes that groundwater reserves remain sufficient in most parts of the country. What is important, however, is the trend. The August warning regarding the possibility of a hydrogeological drought now covers 15 provinces.

The water deficit is also clearly evident in agriculture. In the ninth IUNG-PIB reporting period, covering June 11 through August 10, the average climatic water balance for Poland was -122.8 mm. This was 23.4 mm lower than in the previous period, indicating a further worsening of the precipitation deficit.

The cumulative data illustrate the scale of this year’s agricultural drought even more clearly. After taking into account nine reporting periods, from March 21 to August 10, drought conditions in spring cereal crops were observed in 1,623 municipalities, or 65.47 percent of all municipalities in the country. In the case of spring cereals, the proportion of farmland at risk of yield losses was 24.75 percent.

These three datasets show different phases and manifestations of the same phenomenon. Water shortages are evident in the soil, in rivers, and in shallow groundwater. A few days of rain may improve the situation locally, but it will not make up for losses that have been accumulating over weeks or months.

What Can Be Done Immediately

In discussions about combating drought, it’s very easy to jump straight to long-term programs and large-scale investments. Some of these are necessary, but they don’t answer the fundamental question: what can we do today, using existing infrastructure and available regulatory frameworks?

In my previous publications and speeches, I have repeatedly emphasized the need to increase retention and slow the runoff of stormwater. In a study published in March “Mitigating the Effects of Drought in Practice—Measures Feasible Under Current Conditions,” , I pointed out, among other things, the possibility of reducing runoff from drainage ditches, using small weirs, restoring local retention areas, retaining water in natural depressions in the terrain, and improving the soil’s retention capacity. In other words, actions we can take right here and now, without unnecessary red tape.

Of course, the point is not to retain water everywhere and at any cost. There are places where the rapid drainage of excess water is necessary to protect buildings, roads, or other infrastructure. In the broader context of the issue, however, this should be the exception rather than the rule.

It is important to be aware that, across most of the country, drainage systems are still in operation—systems designed to drain water as quickly as possible and dewater the land. Given the increasingly frequent and prolonged periods without precipitation, maintaining this model of water management is no longer justified.

Also worth noting is the OTOP guide published in August JHow and Why to Retain Water in Agricultural Landscapes. Its greatest strength is its practical approach to the problem. Instead of merely calling for increased water retention in general terms, it outlines specific actions that can be implemented on the farm and in its immediate surroundings.

OTOP highlights similar approaches, including the importance of ponds, seasonal floodplains, tree stands, field margins, vegetation along watercourses, and the organic matter content of the soil. It also demonstrates that routine deepening and desilting of ditches is not always justified from the perspective of water retention in the landscape.

Importantly, the guide does not overlook formalities. Retaining water does not mean arbitrarily damming watercourses or interfering with water structures. Different rules apply to ditches and other natural watercourses, but in each case, the impact of the planned action on neighboring land, buildings, and infrastructure must also be taken into account.

Update to the Drought Mitigation Plan (aPPSS) – consultations have begun

On August 6, 2026, public consultations began on the draft update to the Drought Mitigation Plan. They will continue until February 6, 2027.

This is an important moment, as the plan is intended to set the course of action for the coming years. Comments may be submitted not only by public institutions, but also by local governments, businesses, civic organizations, and individuals. I encourage you to take advantage of this opportunity—not to simply state once again in a document that Poland needs to increase water retention by 5 or 10 percent, but to identify which measures work in practice and what barriers hinder rational water management.

Today, it’s hard to say that we lack knowledge. We have satellite data and monitoring of surface water, groundwater, and soil. We know where shortages occur, and we’re observing how quickly their effects spread from one sector of the economy to another.

That is why drought no longer needs to be diagnosed. We know where it is developing, how deep it goes, and what costs it entails. Europe today does not suffer from a shortage of data, but from a shortage of decisions. Each successive season brings more accurate maps, more precise forecasts, and new records. If action continues to lag behind this knowledge, the problem will no longer be the drought itself. The problem will be our predictable inaction in the face of a phenomenon that has long ceased to be unpredictable.

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Main photo: Piotr Bednarek/Wikimedia, license: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International